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COMMENTARY ON "TOWARDS A MARKET IN 
UNMATURED TORT CLAIMS": A LONG 
WAY YET TO GO 
Alan Schwartz* 
PROFESSOR Cooter has written an interesting and provocative paper 
but it constitutes an introduction to its subject, not a full treatment of it. 
The paper makes two claims: First, tort law forces potential victims to 
purchase excessive insurance against accidents. People will voluntarily 
insure against only those accidents that will increase their marginal utility 
for money, but the law requires full compensation for all tortious injuries. 
When the potential injurer is a seller, who reflects anticipated tort liabilities 
in prices, the law thus requires potential victim buyers to purchase excessive 
insurance. This claim is correct but not original. The first formal proof 
appeared in a 1977 article by Cook and Graham1 and has since been 
reproved by several scholars, including Sam Rea2 and, most recently, me.3 
It is unnecessary to discuss the point again here. Cooter's second claim is 
that the law should be changed to permit a market for unmatured tort 
claims (UTCs) to form.4 My comment analyzes this second claim. 
I will make three points. First, if potential victims can price risks per- 
fectly, then allowing a UTC market, supposing one would arise if there were 
no legal impediment, would increase welfare, though not significantly. It is 
questionable, however, whether the state would permit the bargains that 
would yield this increase. Second, if potential victims are imperfectly 
informed, conventional wisdom holds that no UTC market should be per- 
mitted; if the law did not now erect barriers to the formation of such mar- 
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1 Cook and Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable 
Commodities, 91 Q.J. Econ. 143 (1977). 
2 Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1982). 
3 Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 
353 (1988). 
4 The virtues that Cooter claims for such a market, that it will permit the better 
achievement of the law's compensation and deterrence goals, were anticipated in Friedman, 
What Is 'Fair Compensation' for Death or Injury?, 2 Int. Rev. Law & Econ. 81 (1982), which 
makes many of the same points as the paper here, particularly the claim that a market for 
unmatured tort claims would help avoid the difficulty that compensation would otherwise be 
excessive from an ex ante point of view. The advantages of permitting matured tort claims to 
be sold were recently set out in Shukatis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. Legal 
Stud. 329 (1987). 
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kets, it likely would regulate them out of existence were they to form 
naturally. Third, putting these objections aside, UTC markets may not form 
naturally, and likely would generate undesirable equilibria if they did form. 
Taking the three objections together, I conclude that the case for a UTC 
market has yet to be made. 
I. THE PERFECT INFORMATION CASE 
A. The Bargaining Situation 
When potential injurers and potential victims bargain ex ante, there is no 
need for law reform because a market for UTCs already exists. Consider the 
sale of a product. If the seller proposes reducing the price in return for a 
disclaimer, the seller is seeking to purchase the consumer's unmatured claim 
for damages for breach of warranty; should the consumer agree to the pro- 
posal, she has sold her UTC. If consumers in this market are well informed 
about the probabilities and costs of accidents, the first best solution respect- 
ing compensation and deterrence will be reached. Respecting deterrence, 
the consumer will purchase all marginal reductions in the risk of harm that 
cost the firm less than the consumer is willing to pay for safety; respecting 
compensation, if first-party insurance is cheaper than third-party insurance, 
the consumer will take a disclaimer regarding the remaining risk, and use 
the price saving to buy market insurance.5 This analysis just rehearses the 
well-known result that when information is perfect and the parties can bar- 
gain, a no liability rule is efficient. This result can be rephrased: the exist- 
ence of perfectly competitive product and labor markets implies the 
existence of a thriving and efficient trade in UTCs. Professor Cooter thus 
gives us a new way to put an old result. 
B. The Nonbargaining Situation 
When potential injurers and victims do not bargain, deterrence and com- 
pensation today are achieved through tort suits. The law does not require 
excessive insurance in this case. Potential victims can buy only the first- 
party insurance, against pecuniary harm, that they prefer and will then sue 
for total compensation when injured, thereby facing firms with the full social 
costs of their actions. The question is what is to be gained in the nonbar- 
gaining case by permitting a set of third parties-called here "the buyers"- 
to purchase potential tort claims from nascent victims. In the way of deter- 
rence, nothing: without the buyers, the victims would sue for full compensa- 
tion; with the buyers, the buyers will sue for full compensation. In either 
case, the injurers face the same liability and will respond to it in the same 
5 These points are demonstrated more fully in Schwartz, supra note 3, at 361-68. 
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way.6 There does seem something to be gained on the selling side. Before 
Cooter's suggested reform, potential victims own nothing of value regarding 
a possible accident; were the reform enacted, they would own a UTC that 
can be turned into cash. Removing the legal barrier to the sale of tort claims 
thus creates gains for potential victims that are not offset by losses elsewhere. 
Cooter's proposed reform therefore is efficient. This is not the case for the 
reform that Cooter makes, but it is the best case I see. 
The case nevertheless is problematic. To see why, ask why a potential 
victim would sell a UTC rather than await events. If potential victims are 
more risk averse than the buyers, as seems likely, there are gains from trade. 
The second major reason for a sale is troublesome. Suppose that potential 
victims have higher discount rates than the buyers, because the victims are 
natural persons while the buyers likely are firms. Then there also are gains 
from trade but it is questionable whether society prefers trade. The best case 
for social security, recall, is that people have irrationally high discount rates 
and so will save too little when left on their own.7 So here, potential victims 
may have irrationally high discount rates and thus be willing to sell UTCs 
for too little; if so, the law's compensation goal would be vitiated. This diffi- 
culty could especially infect what may be an important submarket, the sale 
of UTCs for toxic torts. People frequently know that they have been 
exposed to toxic substances but realize also that any resultant disease likely 
will manifest itself after a long latency period.8 The knowledge that one is a 
potential victim would incline one to sell a UTC, but because of the long 
latency period, and low discount rates, the sellers would demand too little. 
To summarize, if information respecting risks is perfect and potential 
injurers and victims bargain ex ante, a UTC market would be in place and 
work perfectly, so there would be no need for Cooter's reform. If no ex ante 
bargains exist, there would be a case for the reform but the case apparently 
6 Third-party purchasers of claims may be able to litigate them more cheaply than seller 
victims because of economies of scale or the efficiencies of specialization. When either 
comparative advantage exists, the deterrence goal apparently would be better served by 
allowing claims to be sold; more valid claims would then be brought against injurers than 
individual victims currently bring. This conclusion does not imply that a market for UTCs 
should exist. Economies of scale today are realized through class actions, and any benefits of 
specialization could be obtained by permitting the sale only of matured claims. See Shukatis, 
supra note 4, at 334-41. 
7 See J. Pechman, H. Aaron & M. Taussig, Social Security: Perspectives for Reform 60-65 
(1968). 
8 Many toxic exposures that eventuate in disease have long latency periods. For example, 
exposure to asbestos, tremolite, anthophyllite, and actinolite may result in diseases the 
symptoms of which will not generally manifest themselves for twenty or more years after the 
initial exposure. See OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. 
? 1910.1001, App. G (1988). 
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does not rest on better achieving the tort law goals of compensation and 
deterrence; rather, it rests on giving potential victims a new asset-a UTC- 
at zero cost. There is reason to believe, however, that the victims would 
charge inappropriately low prices when selling this asset, which would be 
inconsistent with the law's compensation goal. 
II. THE IMPERFECT INFORMATION CASE 
Consumers and firms and workers and firms today can bargain ex ante 
over potential tort claims but the law prohibits such bargains, on the ground 
that consumers and workers are imperfectly informed about risks. The reg- 
nant legal doctrine is strict liability in tort, which bans exculpatory clauses. 
Cooter claims that the primary field of operation for his reform is the bar- 
gain between the potential injurer and potential victim; and he assumes that 
this bargain cannot be conducted today because the law prevents trading in 
UTCs. This assumption is true in the bargaining case but not because 
archaic rules prohibit the sale of causes of action in tort. When courts 
believe that potential victims are informed, as when they are large corpora- 
tions, courts permit the victims to sell their UTCs, by agreeing to disclaim- 
ers. When courts believe that victims are uninformed, these trades are 
prohibited. Thus Cooter's advocacy of a UTC market reduces to the claim 
that the strict liability in tort doctrine should be repealed. To sustain this 
claim, Cooter must show that consumers and workers in fact are informed, 
or can conveniently be informed.9 If he cannot make either showing, no 
state will permit a "UTC market" in the bargaining case. Nor will states 
create a UTC market in the nonbargaining case; the potential victim sellers 
there seem no better informed than are today's consumers and workers, and 
the state will no more permit them to sell UTCs than it now permits con- 
sumers and workers to sell them. 
Cooter tries to meet the imperfect information objection, but his efforts 
need more development than the paper gives them. He initially argues that 
if a potential victim undervalues his claim and so would be willing to sell it 
to the potential injurer for too little, the buyers-insurance companies and 
law firms-will enter to bid the claim up. This argument is incomplete. To 
9 I attempt to make both showings in Schwartz, supra note 3, at 378-84 (arguing that the 
evidence fails to support claims that consumers misperceive risks in such fashion as would 
disadvantage them and that consumer errors cannot be corrected) and so am sympathetic to 
Cooter's thesis. For an earlier effort along the same lines see Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect 
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security 
Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983) (arguing that the existence of imperfect information does 
not cause sellers to degrade the quality of product warranties). Cooter should either explicitly 
adopt my views or, what would be better, improve on them; I haven't convinced as many 
people as I would have liked. 
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see why, suppose that there are no third-party buyers but N sellers exist in 
the relevant product market, each selling a homogeneous good for $100, and 
that consumers are perfectly informed in the two senses that they can 
acquire information about market opportunities at zero cost and can price 
risks accurately. Seller #8 offers to reduce the product's price by $8 in 
return for a disclaimer-that is, offers to buy the UTC for $8. The claim 
actually is worth $12, which the buyer knows. Seller #5, say, will attempt 
to take the sale away from seller #8 by offering a $9 price reduction and a 
disclaimer; but then another seller has an incentive to offer $10. The only 
equilibrium of this process entails all claims selling at their real values-$12 
in this example. Hence, if consumer sellers of UTCs are perfectly informed, 
there is no need to create a set of third-party buyers to protect them. 
Consumers are thought not to be perfectly informed for two reasons: 
First, the costs of acquiring information about market opportunities are pos- 
itive. Consequently, consumer buyers-the UTC sellers here-engage in too 
little comparison shopping; they will too seldom leave seller #8 to learn 
what other sellers are offering. Second, consumer buyers misvalue risks- 
that is, potential tort claims. Cooter apparently accepts the former objec- 
tion; he says that high transaction costs block comparison shopping for 
claims whose contingencies rarely mature. If this objection holds, however, 
the entry of law firms and insurance companies will not cure the problem 
that potential victims will sell their UTCs for too little; the potential victims 
would not shop extensively across potential buyers and so would take insuffi- 
cient advantage of the entry of new firms such as insurance companies. The 
second objection, that potential victims misvalue risks, applies equally to 
persons who do not bargain with firms as to persons who do. In sum, the 
addition of a set of third-party buyers cannot itself cure the information 
problems of insufficient search and risk misvaluation, if these problems actu- 
ally exist. 
Cooter's second attempt to meet the information difficulty is to require 
that the law not enforce the sale of a UTC unless the sale is the result of a 
bargain.?1 This is similar to the rule in some states that the law will not 
enforce a disclaimer unless the parties bargain over it. l Bargaining ensures 
that the buyer knows the disclaimer exists, but the bargain requirement is 
10 Cooter also suggests the additional requirement that a UTC sale should not be enforced 
unless the potential victim has adequate first party insurance at the time an injury occurs. I 
made the similar suggestion that the enforceability of a disclaimer-a UTC sale in a bargaining 
context-should be conditioned on the possession of first-party insurance. The proposal and 
its problems are discussed in Schwartz, supra note 3, at 407-08. 
11 See, e.g., Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P. 2d 1346 (Ct. App. 
1971) ("Disclaimers of warranty are disfavored in the law and ineffectual unless explicitly 
negotiated ... and set forth with particularity ... "). 
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not responsive to the problem Cooter uses it to solve. The bargaining 
requirement does not compel the seller to disclose information about risks; 
hence, buyers will make as many mistakes about risks after the requirement 
is imposed as before. This is why the bargaining requirement permits "bar- 
gained for" disclaimers only if the buyer is a business; states with the 
requirement continue to prohibit disclaimers of consumers' personal injury 
losses. Bargain requirements, in short, respond to the problem that people 
may be unfairly surprised by exculpatory clauses that are set out in fine print 
but do not respond to other aspects of the imperfect information concern. 
If one accepts the common view that imperfect information problems are 
such that individuals should not be allowed to bargain over clauses allocat- 
ing personal injury risks, there is no case for Cooter's reform. It would per- 
mit the very people whom current law prevents from bargaining over risks to 
sell their rights to compensation to potential injurers. Thus it would be bet- 
ter for Cooter first to show that the strict liability in tort doctrine is miscon- 
ceived. Once this is established, the case for a broader UTC market than 
now exists follows naturally. One cannot both accept current substantive 
tort law and advocate the creation of a UTC market. 
III. THE NATURE OF A UTC MARKET 
When the parties do not bargain, one may ask whether a UTC market will 
form naturally and what such a market would look like. These will be 
important questions if Cooter can meet the discount rate and imperfect 
information objections made above. The principal impediment to the forma- 
tion of a market for UTCs is adverse selection. To see the difficulty, consider 
a potential victim who offers an insurance company buyer the victim's right 
to recover for nonpecuniary harm. This claim will be worth little if the vic- 
tim is a stoical person who, in the eyes of a jury, would appear impervious to 
pain; but the claim would be worth a lot if the victim suffers agonies from 
hangnails. Potential victims thus have an incentive to overstate their capac- 
ity to suffer in order to make their UTCs appear more valuable. Because 
information relating to the future value of a consumer's nonpecuniary claim 
is not verifiable-it is known only to the consumer-the UTC market is a 
classic "lemons market," in which the most likely initial equilibrium is for 
potential victim UTC sellers to pool'2 at a low price. When victim sellers 
vary noticeably in their capacity to suffer, the maximizing strategy for buy- 
12 When buyers in a market are of different types, a "pooling" equilibrium exists if the 
sellers cannot distinguish buyers by type and so must charge all buyers the same price for the 
product or service. A "separating" equilibrium exists when sellers can distinguish among 
buyers; then each buyer will be charged a price that reflects the costs of serving him. In the 
example in text, it is the victim sellers whom buyers may be unable to distinguish and so in a 
pooling equilibrium each buyer must pay the same price for every UTC. 
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ers of UTCs would be to suppose that the average capacity is low and so 
offer only low prices. Then either of two outcomes are likely to occur, both 
of which would be unsatisfactory. First, those victims who actually have 
valuable UTCs will defect from the equilibrium and not sell; instead, they 
will sue if they are injured. In this event, the UTC market will unravel- 
there will be too few big sufferers remaining in it to make serving the market 
worthwhile to buyers-and Cooter's reform will be for nought. Analyses of 
insurance markets suggest that this is a possible outcome. The purchaser of 
a UTC claim, as Cooter recognizes, is in effect offering insurance against the 
claim to the potential victim seller. Insurance companies now do not offer 
insurance against nonpecuniary losses partly, it is thought, because they can- 
not distinguish among potential insureds on the ground of capacity to suffer 
and so would be plagued by adverse selection.13 It is unlikely that an insur- 
ance company in its capacity as a tort-claim buyer would offer insurance that 
it now refuses to offer in its capacity as an insurance seller. The second 
likely outcome is that a UTC market will exist and victims will sell UTCs on 
it for low prices, to compensate the buyers for the risk that some of the 
sellers are "lemons." This outcome is inconsistent with the law's compensa- 
tion goal. 
Cooter acknowledges the problem of adverse selection as "an obstacle" 
but not a reason for the law to close markets by fiat. This response is correct 
but insufficient. If a UTC market is unlikely to form, why advocate one? If 
the likely equilibrium in this market, were it to form, would be for potential 
victims to sell valuable claims at fire sale prices, why desire one?14 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The part of this paper that advocates a market for UTCs is interesting but 
not fully worked out. The principal difficulty is that the paper insufficiently 
recognizes that when potential injurers and victims can bargain before acci- 
dents happen, UTC markets will exist naturally. No such markets are seen 
in the consumer and employee case because the law prohibits them on the 
ground of imperfect information. Consequently, the necessary first step to 
13 See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 364-65. 
14 The information problems considered here perhaps could be cured by some form of 
intermediation. Suppose that a labor union bought its workers' UTCs. If the union was better 
informed than its workers about the value of these claims and behaved as a fiduciary toward 
the workers in the sense that it paid workers each claim's true value, then that the workers are 
imperfectly informed about the value of their UTCs would not matter. And if the workers 
behaved as fiduciaries toward their union in the sense that the workers did not overstate the 
value of their claims, the adverse selection problem could vanish as well. The assumptions on 
which these happy results rest seem heroic, however. Also, most potential victims are not 
represented by unions; no other possibly trusting and trustworthy UTC purchaser is apparent. 
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be taken in making a case for UTC markets is to defeat or otherwise cope 
with the imperfect information objection. The second step, if the first can be 
taken, is to characterize the likely equilibrium in the UTC market and show 
that it advances the goals of tort law. The paper takes neither step, and so is 
an interesting and provocative introduction to an important subject, not a 
full treatment of it. 
